PRELIMINARY
A large literature now examines the impact of trade liberalization on wage inequality in developing economies and the findings have been surprising. Contrary to the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade which predicts that wage inequality should fall in developing countries which are abundant in low-skilled labor, most researchers have found that trade liberalization actually increased wage inequality in these countries. 1 Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that trade liberalization is not so much associated with labor reallocation across sectors but rather, with skill-upgrading within industries and firms-a phenomenon reminiscent of the skill-biased technical change (SBTC) story put forward in the U. S. 2 What is the link between trade liberalization and wage inequality in the developing country context? New trade models build on the model of monopolistic competition and increasing returns introduced by Krugman (1979) and introduce firm heterogeneity (Melitz (2003) , Yeaple (2005) ).
Firms differ by an underlying productivity parameter and only the most productive firms find it worthwhile to incur a fixed cost to enter the export market. Reductions in trade costs (i.e.tariffs) encourage more firms on the margin to enter the export sector. Building on the insights of endogenous technological change in Acemoglu (2003) , Bustos (2011) builds a model where firms also choose technology as well as export status. Lower trade costs encourage the most productive firms to incur a fixed cost to upgrade technology which uses more skilled labor. Using a panel of Argentinean manufacturing firms in the context of a regional free trade agreement, MERCOSUR, Bustos finds that trade liberalization led to increases in spending on technology and hiring of more skilled workers. Verhoogen (2008) uses a similar set-up but offers an alternative mechanism linking exports to skill-upgrading, that of product quality-upgrading. In his model, heterogeneous firms produce goods of different quality and only the most productive firms producing the highest quality goods export to rich Northern neighbors. An exchange rate shock lowers the cost of producing quality and lowers the cut-off level for export status. Using a panel data set of Mexican manufacturing plants, he finds that the 1994-1995 Peso devaluation increased exports and wages particularly at those plants with higher initial productivity. 3 In this paper, we build on the basic framework of these new trade models to consider another important aspect of wage inequality-gender inequality. While the link between trade liberalization and demand for skilled workers has been widely and rigorously examined with firm and industry level data, there is relatively little work exploring labor market outcomes of men and women.
Most previous papers use household surveys to examine trends in the gender wage gap and are different from the approach taken here. In one of the earliest studies to employ firm-level data to study gender outcomes, Ozler (2000) finds that female employment share is positively related to export share of output among manufacturing plants in Turkey. Ederington, Minier, and Troske (2010) use firm level data and find that Colombian tariff reforms increased relative employment of blue-collar women, an empirical finding they interpret as being due to reductions in discrimination.
Aguayo, Airola, Juhn, and Villegas-Sanchez (2011) use household and firm level data and find tariff changes accompanying NAFTA increased demand for female labor within and between industries.
Relative to this previous paper, we offer a more in-depth analysis of the mechanisms underlying the within-industry increase in female employment and wage bill share.
Given that many developing countries have already or are now in the process of adopting trade liberalization policies, an important question is whether this will move them closer to, or further from, the goal of gender equality, one of the eight stated goals in the U.N. Millennium Development Goals Report (UN, 2009) . Aside from equity concerns, the effect of liberalization policies on gender outcomes may also be of interest from a long-run growth perspective since there is now growing evidence that empowering women promotes education and better children's outcomes (Thomas (1990) , Duflo (2000) , Qian (2008) ). Thus, in our view, the impact of trade openness on gender 3 Different approaches have been taken to model how firm-level heterogeneity translates into wage inequality among workers. As an alternative to perfect labor markets assumed above, one strand of the literature introduces labor market frictions. For example, Amiti and Davis (2008) develop a model of fair wages in which more productive firms share profits and pay higher wages to workers. Trade and the entry of these productive firms into the export sector increases their revenue relative to non-exporting firms, thereby increasing wage dispersion across firms. Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2008) and Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2011) introduce search frictions where more productive firms search more intensively for quality workers and pay higher wages. inequality is an important question which deserves attention equal to that given to skill premia.
Our model follows closely the models introduced by Melitz (2003) and Bustos (2011) . In our model, old and new technologies require different amounts of white and blue-collar tasks. White and blue collar tasks can be performed by male or female workers. Reminiscent of Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) in which computers replace the need for routine physical tasks, the new technology in our model replaces the need for physically demanding skills, "brawn." Thus, relative to the old technology, women are more productive in blue-collar jobs in the new technology. Using establishment level data from Mexico, we investigate the link between tariff reductions associated with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), exports, and demand for female workers. Consistent with the previous literature and the predictions of our model, we find that tariff reductions increased exports through the entry of new firms into the export sector. We find evidence that these newly exporting firms updated their machinery and equipment, to an even greater extent than existing exporters. In terms of skill-upgrading, we find mixed results. We find little evidence of skill-upgrading (measured as the ratio of white-collar to blue-collar workers) in these newly exporting firms in terms of employment but we do find larger increase in white-collar wages, both in absolute terms and relative to blue-collar wages. Finally, we find that tariff reductions increased the ratio of female blue-collar workers to male blue-collar workers.We find, however, little evidence of increasing female share in white-collar occupations. This paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the tariff reductions that accompanied signing of NAFTA in 1994 and describes the basic trends in relative wages and employment of women in Mexico over the 1990s. Section III outlines the model which links trade liberalization and the demand for female labor. Section IV describes the data. Section V presents the main empirical results. Section VI concludes.
Background

Trade Liberalization under NAFTA
Mexico implemented unilateral tariff reductions in the 1980s to join the GATT in 1986. By 1987, the highest tariff was reduced to 20% and the tariff structure was simplified to include only 5 different rates: 0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%. Starting in 1990, Mexico's opening strategy switched to pursuing bilateral free trade agreements, with the most important being the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with U.S. and Canada which took effect in 1994. NAFTA reduced tariff rates with the U.S. from a maximum of 20% to zero in 15 years and many of the reductions to zero took immediate effect (Zabludovsky (2005) imposed on imports from NAFTA countries (import tariffs) decreased on average by 13 percentage points. Since more than 80% of the trade occurs with the U.S., we would expect a priori that the decline in tariffs would lead to large increases in trade flows. Figure 1 shows the trends in exports and imports as fractions of GDP. The figure shows that while the unilateral tariff reductions had some impact in the 1980s, trade flows accelerated in the 1990s, after the bilateral agreement with the major trading partner was reached. Interestingly, trade flows appear to have stagnated again in the 2000s most likely due to a recession in the U.S. and China's entry into the WTO.
Trends in Women's Relative Wage and Employment Share
While the focus of this paper is to study the impact of trade on production within the firm, it is nevertheless useful to start with an overview of the aggregate change in female wages and employment over this period. Aguayo, Airola, Juhn, and Villegas-Sanchez (2011) use household surveys to examine economy-wide changes. They conclude that women's relative wage increased slightly (see Figure 2 ) even as their relative employment rates increased, suggesting that demand for female labor in the economy as a whole increased. 5 They find that a significant fraction (40 percent) 4 We thank Leonardo Iacovone for providing us with the tariff data. Tariff data was available originally at the 8-digit Harmonized System (HS) classification and was matched to the Mexican CMAP class classification as explained in Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) 5 The figure is reproduced from Aguayo, Airola, Juhn, and Villegas-Sanchez (2011) , and is based on Household
Income and Expenditure Surveys (ENIGH) and the 1990 and 2000 Mexican Population Census. The wage sample of the increase in total wage bill share of women can be attributed to shifts in relative size of sectors (measured by employment or wage bill), a phenomenon which was spurred by the rapid decline of the agricultural sector. While labor allocation across sectors played a role, even a larger fraction of the increase in female wage bill share was due to within-industry shifts towards female labor, a phenomenon which we focus on here. Table 2 presents decompositions of the total change in female wage bill share into "between"and "within" industry shifts in employment and wage bill share. 6
The top two panels of Table 2 are reproduced from Aguayo, Airola, Juhn, and Villegas-Sanchez (2011) and are based on household Census data. The top panel includes all sectors while the middle panel examines the tradeable sector (agriculture and manufacturing) which is directly impacted by
tariffs. The bottom panel shows the results for our balanced panel of 941 firms. In all cases, the "within" industry shift towards female labor accounts for a large portion of the total change. In the paper we investigate the link between trade liberalization and this type of within-industry and within-firm shifts towards female labor.
Trade Liberalization and Gender
Why would trade liberalization have a differential impact on female labor within industries and firms? One possible channel is through the reduction of discrimination brought about by foreign competition. In his seminal work, Becker (1957) hypothesized that employers who are prejudiced against a particular group will be disadvantaged and driven out of business in the long run by forces of competition. Testing this theory, Black and Brainerd (2004) compares across U.S. industries which were more and less impacted by trade. They find that industries which were subject to more competition through trade liberalization experienced greater reductions in the gender wage gap. A recent paper by ? find similar results for employment. Using the Colombian trade liberalization episode over the period 1985-1991 as the source of variation, they find that plants operating in consists of men and women who are 15-64 years old, who reported working full-time (30 hours or more), and who either did not have self-employment earnings or reported that they were not self-employed. We also winsorize the top and bottom 1 percent of observations by gender. 6 The total change in female wage bill share is decomposed as in the following: ∆St = St − Sτ = j ∆sjtEjτ + Σj∆Ejtsjτ , where Ejt is the share of industry j s wage bill in total wage bill at time t, sjt is the female wage bill as a share of total wage bill in industry j at time t. The first expression after the equal sign refers to the "within" component while the latter refers to the "between" component.
industries subject to greater tariff reductions increased the hiring of female blue-collar workers relative to male blue-collar workers. The discrimination story begins with the assumption that men and women are equally productive in the production process. Another possibility, which we explore here, is that men and women embody different amounts and types of skills, and in particular, women have less amounts of physical skill, "brawn," relative to men. The link between trade liberalization and technology upgrading is already well established (Bustos (2011) ). In this paper we explore the notion that the new technology complements female labor by reducing the need for physical skills. Some of these ideas are explored in Weinberg (2000) who uses U.S. data and shows that female employment growth is positively related to computer-use across industries and occupations.
To explore further how employers view female and male workers, we examined questions on hiring preferences which were asked of employers in our balanced panel of firms. 7 In the survey, employers were asked whether they had a preference for hiring males or females or whether they were indifferent between the two. Panel A of Table 3 summarizes the responses to this question by occupation category. The panel shows that there are large differences for male preference across occupation categories, with the most pronounced male preference being in blue-collar occupations such as "specialized workers" and "general workers." For white collar workers such as "managers" employers exhibit no particular preference for hiring male workers. While it is possible that employers discriminate differentially across occupation categories, we find the substantial variation in male preference across occupational categories as evidence that taste discrimination is not the major driving force. In a follow-up question employers are asked the reasons for their preferences and these answers are reported in Panel B of Table 3 . For blue-collar occupations, "heavy work"is overwhelmingly the most common reason given for male preference. Table 3 gives credence to the notion that employers view men and women as distinct inputs with different amounts of skills, particularly when it comes to physical skills in blue-collar occupations.
7 See Section 4 for a full description of the ENESTyC survey and the data.
The Model
The model below follows closely the extension of the Melitz (2003) model proposed by Bustos (2011a Bustos ( , 2011b . Bustos considers different production technologies and workers differentiated by skill; we allow workers to be differentiated by gender as well as skill.
Setup
An economy has consumers with CES preferences buying a continuum of differentiated products.
Consumer utility is (q ω ) ρ dω 1 ρ where q ω is consumption of product variety ω. Under prices p ω , demand for variety ω is q ω = EP σ−1 p −σ ω , where σ = 1 1−ρ , E is total spending and P is the price index. Each product variety is produced by a single firm.
Firms decide whether to enter the market at some fixed cost f e . If they enter, they observe their productivity ϕ, a random draw from a Pareto distribution G(ϕ) = 1 − ϕ −k on [1, ∞). Once productivity is realized, firms can exit. If they stay, they can choose between two technologies, 1 and 2. Technology 1 is a "traditional" technology involving relatively more physically demanding blue collar tasks (such as operating heavy machinery). Technology 2 is a "modern" technology that involves computerized production processes, and achieves higher total factor productivity. Labor is differentiated by education level (blue or white collar) and gender. White collar workers and female blue collar workers have relatively higher productivity under technology 2. This is based on empirical evidence in Bustos (2011b) , showing that exporting firms choose technologies that use more educated workers, and in Weinberg (2000) , showing that modern computerized production technologies favor female workers.
To capture these features, we assume that production involves a combination of blue collar 
for each technology t = 1, 2. For simplicity, A 1 (ϕ) = ϕ and A 2 (ϕ) = γϕ, where γ > 1 to capture higher total factor productivity under the modern technology. We let α 1 > α 2 , capturing the importance of white collar tasks under the modern technology. We further let intermediate inputs be produced using female (f ) and male (m) labor with the appropriate skills (blue or white collar):
for t = 1, 2. We assume β 1 < β 2 to capture the higher productivity of female workers in the blue collar category with technology 2. Technology 1 has a fixed cost f 1 and technology 2 a higher fixed cost f 2 > f 1 . Firms take factor prices W = (W bf , W bm , W wf , W wm ) and the price index P of the consumption goods as given.
Firms that remain on the market also choose whether to export (x) or serve only the domestic market (d). Exporting has a fixed cost f x and iceberg trade costs denoted τ . Given the technology each firm maximizes its profit by choosing the price p d ω of its product on the domestic market (as well as a price p x ω if exporting) subject to consumer demand and the factor prices.
Equilibrium
Let δ be an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm exports and 0 otherwise. Given the technology choice (t = 1, 2) and the export decision, a firm's factor demand is L t j (W, P, ϕ, δ) for each type j of the labor input (j = bf, bm, wf, wm). These factor demands can be obtained using the firm's total cost function, which, for technology t is
where q d and q x denote sales on the domestic and export markets, and κ t is a constant involving the parameters α t , β t and t . 8,9 Using Shepard's lemma, we can obtain the relative demand for female vs. male workers within each occupational category of a firm using technology t as
This expression for the total costs assumes that prices are the same in the domestic and export markets, which will be true in equilibrium.
Once the technology choice and the decision on exporting have been made, let π t (W, P, ϕ, δ) denote a firm's maximized profit. Solving the firm's problem, this can be obtained as
where
enue of a firm that does not export.
Comparing these profits, a firm with productivity ϕ decides whether to stay on the market and whether to export. Specifically, there is a productivity cutoff ϕ * 1 (W, P ) above which firms stay in the market (i.e., serve at least the domestic market), a cutoff ϕ * x (W, P ) above which firms start exporting, and a cutoff ϕ * 2 (W, P ) above which they adopt technology 2. Given W and P , these cutoffs determine total factor demand in the economy. For example, if ϕ * 1 < ϕ * x < ϕ * 2 , then total demand for type j labor is
This can be easily computed using the Pareto distribution assumption and the factor demands from the firm's profit maximization problem. It will be convenient to work with ratios rather than levels, and we find
where R t is the aggregate revenue of firms using technology t (which is a function of the wages W , the productivity cutoffs and the price index P ).
Equilibrium on the labor market requires aggregate demand for each type j labor to equal its supply, assumed constant atL j . This defines the wages W as a function of the productivity cutoffs and the price index P . Using the decomposition
), together with (1)- (2) and (4)- (7), the equilibrium conditions for the relative wages can be written as
The model is closed by assuming free entry. In particular, before learning their productivity ϕ, firms must be indifferent between entering the market or not. This requires expected profits (given W, P and the productivity cutoffs) to equal the fixed cost f e of entry. Using the equations defining the productivity cutoffs, the labor market equilibrium conditions and the free entry condition, the equilibrium factor prices, price index and productivity cutoffs can be obtained.
In equilibrium, ϕ * 1 < ϕ * 2 : low productivity firms use the traditional technology 1 while high productivity firms are willing to pay the higher fixed cost and use technology 2. Following Bustos (2011a), we focus on the case where the export cutoff ϕ * x is between ϕ * 1 and ϕ * 2 . Thus, in equilibrium, some but not all exporting firms use the modern technology.
Trade liberalization
Trade liberalization is modeled as a reduction in the trade costs τ . Under the assumptions of the model, the results in Bustos (2011b) can be extended to establish the following. Proposition 1. A reduction in the tariff τ (i) lowers the export cutoff ϕ * x , (ii) lowers the technology adoption cutoff ϕ * 2 , (iii) increases women's relative wage in the blue collar category, (iv) leads to an increase in the relative number of female workers in the blue-collar category among firms that switch to the modern technology.
Proof. We will use Proposition 1 in Bustos (2011b) to prove these results. To do this, start by using (3) to define the cutoffs ϕ * x and ϕ * 2 as, respectively π 1 (W, P, ϕ * x , 0) = π 1 (W, P, ϕ * x , 1) and π 1 (W, P, ϕ * 2 , 1) = π 2 (W, P, ϕ * 2 , 1). In addition, the exit cutoff ϕ * 1 is defined by π 1 (W, P, ϕ * 1 , 0) = 0. It is convenient to express the first two of these as a function of the third one. Some algebra gives
where λ =
. These cutoffs are identical to those in Bustos (2011b, p18-19) , except for the definition of λ and ϕ * 1 . This implies that the expression for the relative total revenue
is also identical to hers once λ and ϕ * 1 are defined appropriately (p20):
But since under (11) and (12) this expression does not depend on ϕ * 1 ,
Given (11) and (12), parts (i) and (ii) of the Proposition follow directly from Bustos's (2011b) Proposition 1(e). Proposition 1(b) in Bustos (2011b) implies that
follows from (8) that
< 0 as stated in part (iii). This result together with (1) implies that firms that do not change their technology after trade liberalization will have a lower relative demand for blue-collar female workers. Therefore, as stated in part (iv), firms switching technology must increase their demand for these workers or else (iii) could not hold.
Trade liberalization makes exporting more attractive, which lowers the export cutoff ϕ * x . Since the modern technology with higher TFP is more efficient for producing the increased quantity for the export market, more firms adopt this technology (the cutoff ϕ * 2 decreases). Because blue collar female workers are more productive under the modern technology, firms switching technology hire more of these workers, and their relative wage
As mentioned above, the literature suggests that technology upgrading that involves switching to computerized machinery in blue collar production processes should benefit women. By contrast, there does not seem to be any a priori reason why women should have higher or lower productivity in white collar tasks under either technology. Assuming that this is the case, we have the following result.
Proposition 2. If 1 = 2 = , then a reduction in the tariff τ (i) has no impact on women's relative wage or employment in the white collar category, (ii) raises the relative wage of white to blue collar workers if and only if
Proof. Part (i) follows directly from (10). To see part (ii), use (1) and (2) to write the relative wage paid by a firm using technology t as
Using (8)- (10) together with the result that
> 0 (see Proposition 1), one can show that the derivative of this expression with respect to τ is proportional to the expression in the Proposition.
Note that the condition can be satisfied because α 1 > α 2 .
When technology choice does not affect gender differences in white collar tasks, trade liberalization does not affect women's relative outcomes in this category. In addition, part (ii) of the proposition offers a contrast to some of the previous literature examining trade and skill upgrading.
While most previous studies focused on education levels, we study the different tasks within which technology changes can occur. The proposition shows that even if white collar tasks are relatively more important under the new technology (α 1 > α 2 ), whether total wages paid in this category rise or fall depends on the parameters of the model and the pre-existing relative wages of the various inputs.
Data
The data used in this study come from the Encuesta Nacional Table B1 in appendix B).
Most importantly for our study firms provide information about sales, employment, raw materials, capital, as well as their ownership structure. 12 In addition, firms report detailed information on export revenue, technology upgrading and female composition of the work force. In particular, firms report the share of export sales in total sales which allows us to determine the export status of 11 The survey is conducted at the establishment level. However, through out the analysis the words establishment, firm and plant will be used interchangeably. 12 See Appendix A for a detailed description of the data and cleaning procedure and Table B1 in Appendix B for summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Bradford Jensen (1999)) we find that exporters are larger both in terms of employment and sales and are also more capital intensive (see Table Appendix B in the appendix). Interestingly we find significant differences between continuing exporters, new exporters and non-exporting firms. Continuing exporters are on average initially more productive (measured as value added per capita), employ a higher share of skilled labor, pay higher wages and pay higher wages to white collar workers relative to non-exporting firms. This is not the case of newly exporting firms. However, newly exporting firms do show a significant increase in wages and white collar wages between 1991 and 2000.
We are interested in exploring the relationship between export status and technology upgrading.
In order to do so we use measures of investment in technology provided by the ENESTyC survey.
We use several measures provided by the 2001 survey in which firms are asked to write down the investment in technology undertaken by the establishment during 2000 in the following categories:
acquisition of machinery and equipment, R&D, use of brand names and patents, acquisition of brand names and patents, basic engineering and technical assistance, and/or administrative technology.
Firms are also asked whether they bought machinery and equipment at any time during 1999 to 2001.
Finally, a main feature of the ENESTyC survey is that it provides detail information about labor outcomes disaggregated by gender and occupational category. The survey asks firms to fill in the number of employees and wage bill according to four occupational categories: Directors, Managers, Specialized Workers and General Workers. 13 In addition, firms are supposed to detail within each occupational category the number of female/male employees as well as the corresponding wage bill.
13 Directors are "employees that make decisions related to activities in the areas of planning, direction, production policy, financing, marketing, internal organization." Managers include "employees that are not directly involved in the production process but apply scientific knowledge and methods in a variety of areas like technology, economics, sociology, industrial, and government related areas"; professionals (lawyers, chemists, engineers, accountants, etc.;
technicians (lab employees, quality control technician, hydraulic technician, electronic technician, etc.); clerical employees; and supervisors (intermediate managers in the production process who "link higher end managers with those employees in the production process floor."
Tariffs and Export Status
We start by documenting the relationship between trade liberalization and export status. According to Proposition 1, a reduction in trade costs lowers the export cutoff and induces firms at the margin to become exporters. To test this implication using our data, we estimate the following equation:
where i denotes firm and s refers to six-digit sector classification. N ewExporter i,s,2000 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for firms that did not export in 1991 but exported in 2000, and is equal to 0 for all other firms. ∆ExportT arif f s is the sectoral change in US tariffs from 1991 to 2000. X i,s,1991 includes a set of initial firm characteristics that aim to control for firm size, capital intensity, R&D intensity and foreign ownership. δ s are two-digit sector fixed effects. Based on the implications of the model we expect β τ to be negative and significant so that the probability of being a newly exporting firm is highest in industries that witnessed the largest declines in US tariffs.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 show the results from estimating equation 13. Notice that we cluster standard errors at the cmap level to avoid any potential biases resulting from estimating the effect of an aggregate variable (tariff changes correspond to cmap level classification) on firm level outcomes. As expected, the probability of being a newly exporting firm is highest in those industries where the reduction in US tariffs is largest. In particular, our point estimate of -0.042 implies that a firm in an industry experiencing the average reduction in US tariffs (5.2 percentage points) is 21 percentage points more likely to be a newly exporting firm relative to firms that experienced zero tariff change. These results suggest that the impact of tariffs on the extensive margin, the entry of firms into the export market, plays an important role. 14 We next explore the relationship between tariff changes and the intensive margin by regressing 14 In columns (1) and (2) the control group are continuing exporters, non-exporters and stop-exporters however, similar results (coefficient -0.046(std. error 0.006)) are obtained if we focus in the sample of firms that were not exporting in 1991 (i.e., we directly compare newly exporters to non-exporters).
firm-level change in export revenue (as a share of total sales) on tariff changes. Our sample consists of firms who exported in 2000 (i.e., both firms that enter the export market and firms that were already exporting in 1991 and continue exporting in 2000). 15 Columns (3) and (4) in Table 4 where "ContinuingExporters" refers to firms who exported in both 1991 and 2000, "NewExporters" refers to firms who did not export in 1991 but exported in 2000, "StopExporters" refers to firms who stopped exporting, and the omitted category is "Non-Exporters," who did not export in both years. The rest of the RHS variables are the same as in equation 13. "Technology" refers to two measures of investment in technology at the firm level: investment in machinery and equipment and investment in R&D activities. Table 5 shows the results from estimating equation 14.
Columns (1) and (2) Table 5 explore this dimension of the data. Columns (5) and (6) study whether export status is correlated with whether firms conduct R&D activities. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value "1" if the firm conducted R&D in 2000 and zero otherwise. Interestingly, we find that continuing exporters are more likely than non-exporters to engage in R&D spending, but not necessarily the new exporters. One possibility is that R&D is an advanced activity engaged by only the largest and most productive firms. On this dimension, the new exporters appear to more closely resemble non-exporters than continuing exporters. Columns (7) and (8) corroborate these results by using a continuous measure which is investment in R&D as share of income. Since updated machinery is more likely to reflect the technology change in our model, we expect our theoretical results on gender differences to appear mainly among new exporters where such technology adoption seems to be especially prevalent.
So far we have presented evidence on how trade liberalization induces firms to enter the export market and how these firms are more likely to invest in machinery and equipment. While skillupgrading is not our main focus, previous studies find evidence that exporting firms employ more educated workers. Although we expect to find higher education levels in white collar tasks, we modeled the white and blue collar categories as intermediate inputs. Therefore, as Proposition 2(ii) suggests, we may find different results on the effect of trade liberalization on "skill" measured as the number of workers employed in these categories and their relative wages. We estimate the following equation which is similar to the previous estimating equation except that our dependent variable is now the growth rate in the ratio of white-collar workers to blue-collar workers hired. bill, and wage. Table 6 reports the main results. The first three columns report results without including initial firm-level characteristics, while the next three columns report results including these variables. Both in terms of employment and wage bill (reported in columns (1) and (2)), we find little evidence of faster skill-upgrading in exporter firms. We do, however, consistently find that relative wage of white-collar workers to blue-collar workers grew faster in "New-Exporter" firms. For example, in column (3), the coefficient 0.108 indicates that the skill premium increased 10 percent faster in "New-Exporter" firms relative to "Non-Exporter" firms. In column (7) and (8) we examine whether the change in the ratio is due to the growth of white-collar wages or bluecollar wages. The results show that the larger increase in the skill premium is due to the larger increase in white-collar wage. Similar to the results we report here, Verhoogen (2008) also finds little skill-upgrading in terms of employment ratios but finds an increase in the ratio of whitecollar to blue-collar wages. He interprets this result as an increase in skill-upgrading driven by compositional changes in the quality of white-collar workers.
Tariffs and Gender Labor Outcomes
Reduced-Form Effects of Tariffs on Gender Outcomes
We now turn to our main empirical results on gender outcomes. A key implication of our model is that trade liberalization increases the number of new exporting firms and these firms adopt a new technology that increases the productivity of female workers in blue-collar tasks. Accordingly we should observe an increase in the relative wage of female workers in the blue collar category (Proposition 1(iii) ). Similarly, we should observe larger increases in relative employment of female workers in blue collar tasks associated with tariff reductions (Proposition 1(iv)). The implication for white-collar tasks is less clear and would depend on whether the new technology also enhanced the relative productivity of women in white-collar tasks. If that is not the case, we expect no effect on women's relative outcomes in this category (Proposition 2(i)). Table 2 showed that employers did not express any gender preferences in hiring for "'managers"-by far the largest category of white-collar workers, suggesting that employers view men and women as similar type of workers in these tasks. On the other hand, Weinberg (2000) reports that computer investment is positively associated with female employment share across industries and occupations in US data. To answer these questions, we estimate the following equation:
where i denotes firm and s refers to sector. ∆F emaleRatio i,s,t refers to log change in the ratio of female to male outcomes for the three variables-employment, wage bill, and wage. Columns
(1) to (3) of Table 7 refer to white-collar occupations while columns (4) to (6) refer to blue-collar occupations. As shown in the first three columns, we find no evidence that tariff reductions improved relative outcomes of women in white-collar occupations in terms of all three variables, employment share, wage bill share, and wage. Column (4) shows that reductions in tariffs are associated with larger increases in the growth of female employment and wage bill shares. For example, the coefficient -0.039 suggests that a firm in an industry experiencing the average reduction in US tariffs of 5.2 percentage points increased female employment share in blue-collar occupations by approximately 20 percent more than a firm experiencing zero tariff change. In terms of wage bill share, the effects are even larger.
Alternative Channels
The previous table showed that tariff reductions increased the employment and wage bill share of women in blue-collar occupations. We argued that this relationship was driven by the entry of exporting firms which invested in new machinery and equipment and that this new technology raised the relative productivity of female workers in blue-collar occupations. In this section we explore alternative channels which may be driving our results. One possible alternative mechanism is foreign ownership and FDI. It may be the case that the new exporters are more likely to be foreign firms who not only bring newer technology but also less discriminatory attitudes towards hiring women. We explore this alternative by estimating the following equation:
where ∆F oreign i,s,t refers to the change in foreign ownership status. 16 The results are reported in Table 8 . Adding the change in foreign ownership status reduces the size of our coefficients. For example, the effect of tariffs changes on wage bill share is reduced from -0.046 (Table 7 , column 5) to -0.033 in column (5) of Table 8 . We find, however, that the interaction term is not significant suggesting that there is no significant difference in the tariff effect between those who did and did not switch foreign ownership status. In a separate tabulation, we also find that only 8 percent of the new exporters also changed foreign ownership status, suggesting that the majority of new exporters are domestic firms. We also examined whether foreign-owned and domestic companies reported different attitudes towards hiring men over women and find no significant difference, results which are reported in Table Appendix B) . Taken together, these results bolster our confidence that foreign ownership and FDI are not driving our results.
Another possible channel is import tariffs. Reductions in import tariffs may subject domestic firms to competition and either spur technological innovation (for example, as in Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2009)) or reduce discrimination. To the extent that the reductions in import and export tariffs are positively correlated across industries, we may be capturing the impact of import tariffs. We examine this possibility directly by replacing ∆ExportT arif f s with ∆ImportT arif f s and report the results in Table 9 . As the table illustrates, there is no systematic relationship between import tariff reductions and women's relative outcomes.
Effect of Export Status on Gender Outcomes: Instrumental Variables
We have shown that reductions in export tariffs are associated with larger within-firm increases in the relative employment and wage bill share of women in blue-collar occupations. We have also shown indirect evidence that the effect is working through the entry of new firms into the export sector. In this section we formally scale the effect of export status on gender outcomes by regressing gender outcomes on new exporter status, using tariff changes to instrument for new exporter status.
We estimate the following equation: Table 4 , there is a strong robust relationship between new exporter status and tariff changes. The second stage results are reported in the top panel. Again, we find no significant impact of tariff changes on relative outcomes for women in white-collar occupations.
The coefficients we estimate for the blue-collar occupations have the following interpretation. A 10 percentage point increase in the share of new exporters increases female employment and wage bill share by 9.4 and 11.0 percents respectively, and the female-male wage ratio by 2.9 percent. Notes:Panel A reports the percentage of firms that expressed a gender preference when hiring according to occupational category. Obs. refers to the total number of firms and it varies across years and occupational categories because it is based on those firms that hired in that year (Only firms that hired were asked about their gender preferences). The percentage of observations in 1991 for Specialized and General Workers is the same because in that year the survey does not distinguish across these two categories. Panel B reports the distribution of firms according to the main reasons expressed in 2000 for preferring men over women according to occupational category. is value added in 1991. ShareR&Dinit is the share of R&D spending in total income. F oreigninit is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm was more than 10 percent owned by foreign-owned investors in 1991 and zero otherwise. *** , **, *, denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. . ln(K/V A)init is the log of total assets to value added in 1991. ln(V A)init is value added in 1991. F oreigninit is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm was more than 10 percent owned by foreign-owned investors in 1991 and zero otherwise. *** , **, *, denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. Employment. The growth rate is computed as ln((white − blueratio) + 0.001) − ln((white − blueratio) + 0.001)t−1. ln(V A)init is value added in 1991. F oreigninit is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm was more than 10 percent owned by foreign-owned investors in 1991 and zero otherwise. *** , **, *, denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. The growth rate is computed as ln((f emale − maleratio) + 0.001) − ln((f emale − maleratio) + 0.001)t−1. ln(K/V A)init is the log of total assets to value added in 1991. ln(V A)init is value added in 1991. ShareR&Dinit is the share of R&D spending in total income.
Conclusion
F oreigninit is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm was more than 10 percent owned by foreign-owned investors in 1991 and zero otherwise. *** , **, *, denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. (4) to (6) ln(V A)init is value added in 1991. ShareR&Dinit is the share of R&D spending in total income. ∆F oreign is the change in ownership status between 1991 and 2000. *** , **, *, denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. ShareR&Dinit is the share of R&D spending in total income. F oreigninit is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm was more than 10 percent owned by foreign-owned investors in 1991 and zero otherwise. *** , **, *, denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. The wage is computed as the ratio of Wage Bill to Employment. The growth rate is computed as ln((f emale − maleratio) + 0.001) − ln((f emale − maleratio) + 0.001)t−1. ln(K/V A)init is the log of total assets to value added in 1991. ln(V A)init is value added in 1991. ShareR&Dinit is the share of R&D spending in total income. F oreigninit is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm was more than 10 percent owned by foreign-owned investors in 1991 and zero otherwise. *** , **, *, denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. ∆F oreign is the change in ownership status from 1991 to 2000. *** , **, *, denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. The estimation is done by weighted least squares, with weights corresponding to the square root of the share of each product category trade value in the total 2-digit sector trade value. From this regression we obtain predicted log unit export prices for each UN ISIC Rev3 category. Finally, using the previous weights and the correspondence between the ISIC classification and the CMAP classification we compute a weighted average of the predicted unit values belonging to the same 2-digit sector CMAP classification. We normalize the export price series for each industry to the same base year as the domestic producer price index. the expenditure in materials paid at home and the expenditure in imported materials. To obtain a price index for imports at the CMAP branch level we follow the same procedure as for the export price index, this time using Mexican imports from the rest of the world by product category.
-Capital: The ENESTyC survey does not differentiate among different types of capital stock and therefore we use the PPI to deflate the value of total assets. Notes: ln(K/V A) is the log of total assets to value added. ln(V A) is the log of value added. ShareR&D is the share of R&D spending in total income. ln(K) is the log of total assets. Employment is the total number of employees. F oreign is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm was more than 10 percent owned by foreign-owned investors and zero otherwise. Exporter is a dummy that equals one if the firm reported sales revenue abroad and zero otherwise. ExportShare is the share of export revenue in total sales. 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 year Non−Oil Exports Imports Non−oil Exports and Imports as share of GDP 
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